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Abstract
The idea of gravity as an “emergent” phenomenon has gained popularity in
recent years. I discuss some of the obstacles that any such model must overcome
in order to agree with the observational underpinnings of general relativity.
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Over the past few years, the idea of gravity as an “emergent” phenomenon has become
increasingly popular. Emergence is seldom sharply defined, and the notion has been described as
“vague and contentious” [1], but the basic picture is that gravity, and perhaps space or spacetime
themselves, are collective manifestations of very different underlying degrees of freedom. Such
proposals are not new—Wheeler wrote about pregeometry as early as 1963 [2], and Finkelstein
introduced a version of causal set theory in 1969 [3]—but historically they were marginal aspects
of research in quantum gravity, whose most noted proponents were often outsiders to the field
(e.g., [4–6]). More recently, though, such mainstream approaches as string theory matrix models
[7], the AdS/CFT correspondence [8, 9], loop quantum cosmology [10], and quantum Regge
calculus [11] have all been described as “emergent.”
Given the enormous difficulty of quantizing general relativity, it is natural to consider the
possibility that we have simply been trying to quantize the wrong degrees of freedom [12, 13].
But general relativity has an enormous body of observational support, and models of emergence
face formidable challenges in reproducing these successes. The goal of this article is to explain
some of these challenges.
This is by no means a comprehensive survey of emergent gravity. The specific models I refer
to have been chosen primarily as exemplars for particular issues, and most of the ideas are well
known to those working in the field, although they have not been collected in one place. For
broader reviews, see [14] or articles in [15].
I should also start with a cautionary note. In one sense, any quantum theory of general
relativity will have “emergent” aspects. All observables (in Dirac’s sense) are necessarily nonlocal
[16, 17], so locality must be an emergent property. Moreover, for asymptotically anti-de Sitter
spacetimes, and perhaps for asymptotically flat spacetimes as well, the algebra of observables is
isomorphic to an algebra of operators at an asymptotic boundary [18], so the bulk physics can
itself be viewed as emergent from a boundary theory. Such a picture seems contrary to the spirit
of emergence, since the boundary degrees of freedom are merely asymptotic values of ordinary
bulk degrees of freedom, but I do not know how to make this distinction precise.
1 Classifying emergent models
My aim is to describe obstacles facing all models of emergent gravity, rather than focusing
on details of any particular approach. Still, it will be useful to distinguish two broad categories
of models that face rather different challenges.
The first category, which I will call type I, comprises models in which the fundamental
degrees of freedom live in some sort of “environment”: a medium, a lattice, a pre-existing space
or spacetime, or the like. Examples include analog models based on fluid flows and similar
phenomena [19–22], gravity-like excitations near the Fermi point [6, 23], quantum Hall effect
edge states [24], deformations in an elastic solid [25], and spin systems on a fixed lattice [26,27].
The background environment can have fairly minimal structure; in “pregeometric” models, for
example, composite gravitons appear in what is initially a purely topological manifold [28–32].
Type I models must typically decouple the environment from observable quantities quite strongly
to reproduce observation.
The second category, which I will call type II, comprises models in which space or spacetime
are themselves emergent. Examples include graph-based models such as quantum graphity [33]
and DUCTs [34], group field theory [35, 36], certain matrix models [37], Wheeler’s notion of
“it from bit” [38], and other attempts to model the Universe as a quantum computer [39, 40].
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Arguably, some versions of the AdS/CFT correspondence [8,41,42]—those in which the conformal
field theory is considered primary and the bulk spacetime emergent—fall into this category; the
CFT lives in some lower dimensional, nondynamical space, but points in that space need not have
any relationship with points in our bulk spacetime, so the latter might be considered emergent.
In type II models, before even asking about contact with observation, one must typically work
quite hard to find observables that display the large scale existence of spacetime at all.
The distinction I am making is similar, although not quite identical, to Bain’s differentiation
between emergence from a “spatiotemporal structure” and a “non-spatiotemporal reality” [43].
It is not a sharp one. Causal set models [44,45], for instance, contain elements of a pre-existing
spacetime in the form of points and their causal relations, but the continuum is emergent. If the
conformal field theory is viewed as primary in the AdS/CFT correspondence, our bulk spacetime
might be considered emergent, but if the correspondence is a true duality, the bulk spacetime is
present from the start. The hypothesis of spontaneous dimensional reduction at short distances
[46,47], the dynamical generation of extra dimensions [48], and some “CFT primary” forms of the
AdS/CFT correspondence [42] suggest another possibility: some dimensions may be emergent
while others are not.
I am omitting a third category, models in which spacetime, the metric, and diffeomorphism
invariance are present, but the dynamics of gravity is emergent. The archetype is Sakharov’s
induced gravity [49, 50], in which the Einstein-Hilbert action first appears as a counterterm in
the matter action.∗ From the point of view of effective field theory [51], the distinction between
such models and general relativity is marginal: an effective action includes all possible terms,
and it is not clear that one can distinguish their origins. Also in this category are models in
which the dynamics of the metric is determined by thermodynamics [52–54], or as a consistency
condition for the propagation of other fields [55]. While these are certainly interesting, they fail
my (perhaps narrow) criteria for emergence unless the metric is absent as a fundamental field.
2 Gravity as a metric theory
Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to review the physical basis for treating gravity as
a metric theory. As first discussed by Weyl and later developed by Ehlers, Pirani, and Schild [56],
the observations of local Lorentz invariance and the universality of free fall allow one to construct
a metric description of gravity. Briefly summarized, the argument goes as follows [56, 57] (for a
somewhat different approach, see section 2.3 of [58]):
1. Local Lorentz invariance implies the existence of a field of light cones, which establishes
a causal structure and a topology. The light cones also determine a conformal structure—
an equivalence class of metrics that differ only by local rescalings—for which paths of light
rays are null geodesics.
2. The equivalence principle, specifically the universality of free fall, determines a set of
preferred paths in spacetime, the trajectories of freely falling structureless objects. Such
a projective structure, in turn, determines an equivalence class of affine connections for
which these paths are geodesics.
∗In some Sakharov-inspired models, the metric appears only as a collective field. I consider such models to be
emergent; the examples I am aware of are type I. Note that because the metric is a functional of other fields, the
resulting field equations may differ from those of general relativity even if an Einstein-Hilbert action is induced [13].
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3. Compatibility of these two structures—the observation that the trajectories of freely
falling massive objects lie within the light cones but can “chase” light arbitrarily closely—
fixes a Weyl structure, an equivalence class of conformal metrics and affine connections
such that
∇agbc = Aagbc for some vector field A. (2.1)
As Einstein first noted, though (see [59]), unless Aa is of the form ∂aϕ for some scalar ϕ, eqn.
(2.1) implies that lengths change under parallel transport. This would lead to a “second clock
effect,” a dependence of the rate of a clock on its history. The observation that this is not the
case in our Universe suggests a further condition:
4. The absence of a “second clock effect” implies that the vector A can be eliminated
by a Weyl transformation, picking out a unique representative of the conformal class of
metrics. This requirement can be replaced by a number of others: for instance, that
neighboring clocks remain synchronized [56] or that matter waves follow geodesics in the
short wavelength limit [60].
Together, these observations imply that motion in a gravitational field can be described as
geodesic motion in a Lorentzian spacetime, with a metric providing a full description of the
field. To go beyond this kinematic setting and obtain the dynamics of general relativity, more is
needed. One avenue—certainly not the only one—is this:
5. The absence of nondynamical background structures implies “general covariance” in
the sense commonly used by physicists [61]: gravity should be described by diffeomorphism-
invariant expressions involving only the metric and other dynamical fields. This is a new
assumption: while Lorentz invariance restricts nondynamical objects, it does not eliminate
them. A flat background metric, for instance, is allowed by Lorentz invariance, but permits
Nordstrøm’s conformally flat theory and Rosen’s bimetric theory (see [58]); a nondynamical
volume element, also allowed by Lorentz invariance, permits unimodular gravity [62].
We must still address the possibility of additional dynamical fields. We can, of course, elimi-
nate these by fiat—in a scalar-tensor theory, for instance, we can call the purely metric piece of
the interaction “gravity” and relegate the scalar to the status of an extra “fifth force.” Alterna-
tively, note that our kinematic assumptions led to a picture in which the response of matter to
the gravitational field depended solely on the metric. We might ask that the reciprocal response
of the gravitational field to matter also occur solely through the metric, with no added fields
whose sole function is to mediate between the two (as in, for instance, TeVeS [63]). That is,
6. The decoupling of any nonmetric degrees of freedom from the dynamics of gravity
implies that the gravitational effective action should depend on the metric alone.
7. The methods of effective field theory then tell us how to formulate the action [51].
At the scales at which a metric description applies, the effective action will include all
possible local, diffeomorphism-invariant functions of the metric that are not excluded by
other symmetries. At low energies, this effective action will coincide with the Einstein-
Hilbert action, albeit with a cosmological constant whose magnitude remains a mystery.
One caveat remains: the derivative expansion that defines the effective action works only if
the metric varies slowly compared to the Planck scale. This is certainly true observationally,
but at a deeper level it is a further mystery.
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These arguments do not require that the metric be a fundamental degree of freedom. Rather,
they describe the setting in which an effective metric description might naturally emerge. On
the one hand, this provides hope for emergent gravity: only a few steps are needed to obtain
a model that agrees with observation. On the other hand, though, none of these steps can be
avoided, and this places severe restrictions on such models. Most of the pitfalls I describe below
arise, directly or indirectly, from these requirements.
3 Challenges for models of emergent gravity
The preceding section established a set of conditions that a model of emergent gravity should
meet to reproduce general relativity. While such a criterion may be too strong at cosmological
or sub-millimeter distances, general relativity is extremely well established at intermediate scales
[58, 64], and any disagreements are strongly constrained by observation. Let us now try to
understand the extent to which these conditions create obstacles for emergent gravity.
3.1 Lorentz invariance
We start with Type I models, in which the fundamental degrees of freedom live in a space
or spacetime environment. The basic problem is clear: unless that background is itself Lorentz
invariant, it must decouple from observable quantities strongly enough to match observations.
Since experimental limits on Lorentz violation are very strong [65], this is a severe restriction.
Perhaps surprisingly, we have simple examples in which such a decoupling occurs, at least
to lowest order. In many analog models—models in which curved spacetimes are mimicked
by phenomena such as fluid flows—small perturbations in the flow satisfy Lorentz invariant
equations, with an effective “speed of light” determined by properties of the medium [19, 20].
Quite generally, linearization of a field theory around a nontrivial background leads to an effective
Lorentzian metric [66], whose signature is fixed by the hyperbolicity of the partial differential
equations. At higher orders, Lorentz violations reappear [67,68], and can serve as constraints on
such models.
Problems arise, though, as soon as more than one kind of excitation can occur. In that case,
distinct excitations typically have distinct Lorentz invariances, with different effective metrics and
speeds of light [14,69]. Even this is a special case; in general, the Lorentzian geometry becomes
Finslerian, losing contact with the desired physics. One can sometimes recover a single metric
by imposing a discrete symmetry on the fundamental fields [70, 71], but this step seems rather
artificial. Note that it is not enough to simply claim that the excitations are all perturbations of
the same medium: even in an ordinary elastic solid, longitudinal and transverse waves travel at
different speeds.
One solution is to postulate that the “environment” is itself Lorentz invariant. If this environ-
ment is a spacetime, this begs the question: as in the EPS construction of section 2, invariance
implies the existence of a conformal class of metrics, and one must explain why these are not al-
ready dynamical. Models such as [72] in which the background has no metric avoid this problem,
and Lorentz invariance may be inserted by hand as a gauge symmetry. Relating this symmetry
to spacetime Lorentz invariance requires a fairly elaborate scenario, though: one must ensure the
emergence of a nondegenerate soldering form, a tetrad whose two-index structure “solders” the
fibers in which the gauge group acts to the spacetime [73].
If the background is discrete, one must work harder. As Dowker has emphasized [74], Lorentz
invariance requires a radical nonlocality on a lattice, in the sense that each point has infinitely
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many nearest neighbors [44, 75]. Causal set theories [45, 74, 76] can achieve statistical Lorentz
invariance with a suitable “sprinkling” of spacetime points, but this becomes much harder if
one starts with a more complex discrete structure. Causal dynamical triangulations [11] may
recover Lorentz invariance as an average over noninvariant simplicial complexes, but this is not
certain; the continuum limit of this model may be a Horˇava-Lifshitz theory with a preferred time
slicing [77,78].
One may look instead for models in which Lorentz invariance is only recovered at large
distances. After all, ordinary lattice quantum field theory is constructed on a lattice that is not
even rotationally invariant, but by tuning parameters to a second order phase transition one can
send correlation lengths to infinity, wiping out any memory of the underlying lattice. It is not
clear that a similar procedure exists for Lorentz invariance, though, where the correlations must
respect the light cone structure. One possible ingredient could be an emergent supersymmetry,
which can suppress Lorentz violation [79].
Alternatively, Lorentz invariance could appear as a low energy symmetry under the renor-
malization group flow [80]. Models are known in which different “speeds of light” flow to a single
value at an infrared fixed point [81], but this flow is typically only logarithmic in energy, requiring
enormous initial energy scales or delicate fine tuning to meet observational constraints.
For type II models, Lorentz invariance may be less contrived. By a century-old argument [82],
the existence of inertial frames, isotropy of space, and the relativity principle are enough to imply
Lorentz transformations with some (perhaps infinite) “speed of light.” For type I models, the
presence of a background typically violates either isotropy or relativity, but this need not be the
case for for type II models. The effective speed of light might then be determined dynamically,
for example from the Lieb-Robinson limit on the speed of information propagation [83] or from a
group structure already present in the fundamental degrees of freedom [84]. But while isotropy
may be natural, the relativity principle is more problematic. The Lorentz group is noncompact,
so transformations must relate inertial frames that are arbitrarily “distant” (although it is again
conceivable that an emergent compact supersymmetry could help). This noncompactness also
makes it difficult to achieve Lorentz invariance by averaging over noninvariant configurations,
since the integral over boosts diverges, though there has been some work on defining a group
average [85].
Of course, we have not experimentally tested Lorentz invariance up to infinite boost. But even
violations at very high energies can feed back into quantum field theory through loop effects and
lead to drastic consequences at low energies [86], although there are proposals for avoiding this
problem (e.g., [87]). Small violations of Lorentz invariance also lead to problems with black hole
thermodynamics: unless black holes simply do not exist in the underlying theory, such effects
generically violate the generalized second law of thermodynamics, allowing perpetual motion
machines [88,89].
3.2 Principle of equivalence
The principle of equivalence takes a number of different guises, not all exactly equivalent.
For our purposes, the most relevant version is the universality of free fall, with its implication
that all forms of matter couple to gravity with equal strength. As Feynman emphasized [90], this
universality implies a spin two graviton: energy falls with the same acceleration as mass, and
the unique Lorentz covariant combination of mass and energy density, the stress-energy tensor,
couples to spin two. A model of emergent gravity must thus ensure that
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1. only one massless spin two field is relevant;
2. this field couples with equal strength to all matter;
3. any spin zero or spin one components of the interaction are absent or strongly suppressed.
(In some models [24], higher spin interactions must also be suppressed.)
The principle of equivalence is extremely well tested from millimeter to Solar System distances
[58, 91], so while the very short and long distance behavior may differ, these requirements are
quite strong.
In type I models, the would-be gravitational degrees of freedom typically have no initial
connection to the geometry; their role as a metric emerges later. Hence there is no obvious reason
to expect only a single massless spin two field. For a large class of models built from field theory
fluctuations around a linearized background [69], for instance, many “gravitons” appear, and the
imposition of an ad hoc symmetry [70] is the only known way to force universality. In models of
composite gravitons, a similar multiplicity of potential metrics occurs [92]. One can argue that
if the effective action is invariant under diffeomorphisms and local Lorentz transformations, only
one such field will remain massless, with the others acquiring large masses [92]—typically on the
order of the Planck mass, although approximate symmetries can make them smaller [93]. The
requirement of exact invariance is, of course, a very strong one: strong enough, in fact, to forbid
more than one massless graviton [94]. But this solution is also problematic, since most models
with massive spin two fields are sick, containing negative energy Boulware-Deser ghosts [95].
While a few exceptions exist [96–99], these require a very special form of the action, and it is not
at all clear how such a feature would emerge from a more primitive model.
Once one has a single metric, though, a result of Weinberg offers a path for deriving the
equivalence principle [100]. The “soft graviton theorem” shows that a Lorentz-invariant, massless
spin two particle that can scatter nontrivially must couple universally to a single conserved stress-
energy tensor. One must be careful of assumptions here; see the discussion below of the Weinberg-
Witten theorem. In particular, Weinberg’s result are only relevant if Lorentz invariance has
already emerged. But the theorem suggests that if only one metric is present, universal coupling
may not be arbitrary, but may be associated with the universality of Lorentz invariance.
For type II models, the primary question comes earlier: does a dynamical spacetime emerge
at all? If the fundamental degrees of freedom generate such a spacetime at some scale, a metric
description offers a natural way to describe the dynamics. As in ordinary general relativity,
one might then expect a single spacetime to have a single metric. On the other hand, if matter
emerges from the same degrees of freedom, Weinberg’s soft graviton theorem, with its requirement
of Lorentz invariance, is the only reason I know to expect universal coupling. Since very few type
II models are yet able to describe the coupling of matter to gravity, much less to compare
couplings of more than one species of matter, the problem remains almost completely open.
3.3 Self-coupling
One aspect of universal coupling deserves special attention: we observe gravity’s coupling to
its own energy to occur at the same universal strength as its coupling to matter [58, 101]. This
self-coupling implies that the interaction is nonlinear, and, in fact, it can be used to determine
the nonlinear terms, giving another route to the Einstein field equations [90,102–104].
This property places requirements on emergent models beyond the linear approximation.
Obtaining the correct linear behavior—a massless spin two excitation, even with the correct
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coupling to matter—is not sufficient to show that one has a model with gravity. Indeed, there
are known examples (e.g., [24, 26]) in which the correct nonlinear behavior seems to require a
good deal of fine tuning.
If one can obtain Lorentz invariance and diffeomorphism invariance, however, these provide
some very helpful constraints. As Kraichnan first showed [102], if one starts with a massless spin
two field hab on a manifold with a flat metric ηab and assumes that its field equations can be
derived from a Lorentz invariant, diffeomorphism invariant action with no additional background
structures, then the action can depend only on the combination ηab+hab. This largely determines
the form of the nonlinearities to be those of general relativity, thus fixing the self-coupling.
3.4 Diffeomorphism invariance I
Diffeomorphism invariance is a notoriously slippery concept in general relativity [61,105]. The
rather heuristic form I will use is the absence of any nondynamical background structure that
could define a preferred reference frame. Most type I models have a nondynamical background,
so the issue is again one of decoupling. Most type II models do not, but one must show that
the emergent spacetime is enough like a smooth manifold for diffeomorphism invariance to make
sense at all. Note that while diffeomorphism invariance and Lorentz invariance are conceptually
distinct, they are not completely unrelated: in an “already Lorentz invariant” model, the only
invariant background structures are a flat metric and a volume element, so the possible forms of
diffeomorphism noninvariance are restricted.
As Witten has stressed [9], diffeomorphism invariance also requires the absence of local ob-
servables [16,17]. This presents yet another decoupling problem [106]: in type I models, all local
observables, including any fundamental stress-energy tensor, must be invisible at the scale at
which gravity emerges, while in type II models, the emergent spacetime should probably be free
of local observables from the start.
For type I models, the problem of diffeomorphism invariance parallels the decoupling problem
for Lorentz invariance. One case is known in which a weak form of diffeomorphism invariance
appears [71]. In this analog model, Nordstrøm gravity emerges at lowest order, but conformal
invariance of the matter fields makes the flat background metric unobservable, leaving only a
background conformal structure. For other models, useful insights may come from the existing
body of work on diffeomorphism invariance on a lattice. While some of this work directly ad-
dresses emergent models [107], much of it is in the context of lattice regularization of general
relativity [108–113]. In particular, there are interesting ideas for obtaining an invariant lattice
action—a “perfect action”—from a Wilsonian coarse-graining of the continuum [108–110, 113],
which could point to a new type of emergent model.
A new problem arises in models in which the time evolution of the fundamental degrees of
freedom depends on data in a finite region, as is the case in lattice models [34]. Consider two
disjoint spatial regions R1 and R2 at time t1, initially evolving independently, and let I(R1) and
I(R2) be their respective future domains of influence. If these domains overlap at some later
time t2, the relative rate of evolution can matter: the data in R1 at time t1, for instance, will
change the data in I(R1) ∩ I(R2) at time t2, and thus the subsequent evolution of R2. Using
a term from computer science, Wall calls this the “race problem”: two independent regions are
“racing” toward the intersection I(R1)∩ I(R2) , and the one that gets there first determines the
subsequent evolution. Such behavior, which is known to occur in particular models, clearly breaks
diffeomorphism invariance; in an emergent gravity model, it would be interpreted as a failure
of Hamiltonian constraints smeared by two different lapses to weakly commute. Avoiding this
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problem seems very difficult, requiring either an arbitrary division of space into nonoverlapping
regions or the imposition of extremely delicate consistency conditions. It can be argued that
these consistency conditions appear automatically for a “perfect action,” a discrete action that
is already invariant under the full diffeomorphism group [108, 114], but it is not clear how such
a structure would arise from a more primitive noninvariant theory.
For some type II models, another problem can occur. While such models involve emergent
space, some (e.g., [33, 39]) include a time parameter to describe the evolution of the underlying
degrees of freedom. In such cases, one must worry about the relationship between this fun-
damental time and the emergent time in the description of gravity. This is another decoupling
problem: the time in which the fundamental degrees of freedom evolve is a background structure,
and any coupling to the emergent degrees of freedom would define a preferred time and break
diffeomorphism invariance.
3.5 Diffeomorphism invariance II
Diffeomorphism invariance plays another key role in general relativity: it eliminates the spin
zero and spin one degrees of freedom, leaving only spin two modes. In the ADM formalism, the
spatial metric and its conjugate momentum form six independent canonical pairs (qij , pi
ij), but
the four diffeomorphism constraints eliminate four pairs. It is crucial that the constraints are
first class (i.e., that the commutator of two constraints is itself proportional to the constraints);
a first class constraint eliminates two phase space degrees of freedom, while a second class con-
straint eliminates only one [115]. While the presence of additional degrees of freedom cannot
be completely excluded by experiment, spin zero or one components of gravity are very strongly
constrained, since, for example, they would imply violations of the principle of equivalence.
This aspect of diffeomorphism invariance presents a particularly strong challenge for emergent
models, since an “approximate symmetry” can be qualitatively different from an exact one.
Suppose, for instance, that an emergent weak gravitational field can be described at some length
scale by a Lorentz invariant spin two field, but without the gauge invariance corresponding to
linearized diffeomorphisms. The lowest order action is then the Fierz-Pauli action for a field of
mass m. But although linear diffeomorphism invariance is restored in the m → 0 limit, that
limit differs from weak field general relativity [116,117], and gives incorrect predictions for Solar
System tests. This van Dam-Veltman-Zakharov (vDVZ) discontinuity arises because an extra
scalar mode fails to decouple even in the massless limit. Moreover, as noted earlier, nonlinear
extensions of this model typically contain negative energy Boulware-Deser ghosts [95,96].
As Vainshtein first pointed out [118], the vDVZ discontinuity may indicate a breakdown
of weak field perturbation theory: nonlinear effects proportional to inverse powers of m may
appear, signaling the onset of a strong coupling regime. The unwanted scalar mode might
then be screened, and a different perturbative expansion at short distances might more closely
approximate general relativity (see [96] for a review). This mechanism has been confirmed for
particular models (e.g., [119–121]), and with a very special choice of action, the Boulware-Deser
ghosts may also be banished [97–99]. But if the Vainshtein mechanism applies, it poses a new
challenge: since the usual weak field approximation can no longer be trusted, one must work
hard to find even a Newtonian limit for emergent gravity.
To a certain extent, this argument can be turned on its head: if one is certain that a massless,
Lorentz invariant, purely spin two field has emerged with no lower spin partners, this strongly
suggests the presence of diffeomorphism invariance or a similar symmetry. A symmetric rank
two tensor field hab contains components of spin zero, one, and two, and the only known Lorentz
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covariant way to project out the lower spins is with a gauge invariance. At linear order, the
minimal requirement is invariance under “transverse diffeomorphisms,” diffeomorphisms gener-
ated by those vector fields ξa for which ∂aξ
a = 0 [122–124]. This group may be extended by
including the remaining diffeomorphisms, giving full diffeomorphism invariance, or by appending
Weyl transformations, yielding “WTDiff” invariance [123]. Contrary to popular folklore, how-
ever, neither extension is required for a consistent nonlinear theory; Wald [126] and Heiderich and
Unruh [127] have explicitly constructed consistent non-covariant models of interacting massless
spin two fields, and the latter contain explicit transverse diffeomorphism invariance.†
If one makes the much stronger assumption that the field is sourced by its own stress-energy
tensor, then, as noted above, general relativity (and thus full diffeomorphism invariance) will
emerge [103, 104], although for the exceptional choice of a WTDiff-invariant linearized action
one may instead obtain unimodular gravity [123–125]. The Weinberg-Witten theorem, described
below, leads to a similar conclusion, that a pure spin two field with a conserved source must
normally be a gauge theory.
If Lorentz invariance is not exact, the Fierz-Pauli action is no longer unique. The problem
then becomes more difficult to analyze, although there are some models that appear to avoid
both ghosts and the vDVZ discontinuity [128]. But similar issues of extra “gauge” modes appear
in other settings, such as lattice models [129]. A basic lesson is that the linear approximation
may be quite misleading; one must ensure that any undesirable lower spin modes decouple at the
full nonlinear level.
3.6 Diffeomorphism invariance and flat backgrounds
It is worth noting a somewhat subtle technical issue in emergent diffeomorphism invariance.
Under an infinitesimal diffeomorphism generated by a vector field ξ, the metric transforms as
gab → gab +∇aξb +∇bξa = gab + gac∂bξ
c + gbc∂aξ
c + ξc∂cgab (3.1)
The last term is crucial: it reflects the fact that diffeomorphisms “move points,” and are not just
ordinary pointwise gauge transformations.
Suppose, however, one expands around a flat metric ηab. Then to lowest order, (3.1) becomes
ηab → ηab + ηac∂bξ
c + ηbc∂aξ
c. (3.2)
The crucial derivative is now hidden. This is not uncommon in emergent gravity (for example,
[26,130]), where it may seem natural to build diffeomorphisms out of local gauge transformations.
But as a pointwise transformation, (3.2) is not yet a diffeomorphism—it is easy to check, for
instance, that the algebra of such transformations is not the algebra of diffeomorphisms—and
the nonlinear interactions of general relativity do not automatically appear. As in the preceding
section, a reliable demonstration of diffeomorphism invariance requires an expansion to nonlinear
order.
3.7 The Weinberg-Witten theorem
In 1980, Weinberg and Witten proved a result that further constrains type I emergent models
[131]. The theorem can be stated as follows (see [133,134] for further discussion):
†Wald notes that it may be difficult—in some cases impossible—to couple such models to matter through the
standard stress-energy tensor. But in the context of emergent gravity, one cannot simply assume the standard
coupling; one should start with the underlying theory and see what coupling emerges.
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Let T µν be a Lorentz covariant, conserved current. Then no massless spin
two field can carry a nonzero charge under the operator Pµ =
∫
d3xT µ0.
In particular, if T µν is a conserved stress-energy tensor, the theorem asserts that no massless
“graviton” can carry energy or momentum.
The Weinberg-Witten theorem uses no detailed properties beyond Lorentz invariance and
conservation, and applies to composite as well as elementary fields. Naively, it would seem to
rule out any theory, including general relativity, in which the gravitational field carries energy.
This cannot be the case, but by seeing how particular models evade the result, we can understand
the true limits.
Let us start with general relativity in the weak field approximation. The obvious loophole
is that the stress-energy tensor is not conserved, ∂µT
µν 6= 0, but only covariantly conserved,
∇µT
µν = 0. But one can always add a gravitational stress-energy pseudotensor to form a
conserved current. Contrary to some claims in the literature, the resulting quantity can be
fully Lorentz covariant: its definition requires a flat background metric, but this need not lead
to any Lorentz violation [132]. The result is not a tensor with respect to general coordinate
transformations, but it is not obvious that this is relevant, since the proof of the theorem does
not rely explicitly on general covariance.
The real issue is somewhat more subtle. The Weinberg-Witten theorem requires a “pure”
spin two field, with no spin zero or spin one admixtures. We may achieve this in two ways:
– We may project out the unphysical helicity zero and one states. But such a projection is
only Lorentz covariant up to a gauge transformation, violating one condition of the theorem.
– We may appeal to diffeomorphism invariance to argue that the spin zero and one compo-
nents of the metric are “pure gauge,” and therefore irrelevant. But this argument only
works in a gauge covariant formulation. We are caught: the stress-energy pseudotensor is
not covariant, while the covariant stress-energy tensor is not conserved.
It is this interaction of gauge invariance and Lorentz invariance that provides the loophole.‡
Now, if a model of emergent gravity reproduces general relativity above some length scale
L, the same loophole should apply at that scale. The question becomes whether the Weinberg-
Witten theorem restricts the model at shorter scales. Possible solutions include [14,135]
1. Broken Lorentz invariance: in analog models [19] and models in which the graviton is a
Goldstone boson for broken Lorentz invariance [14,133,136], for instance, the fundamental
degrees of freedom are not Lorentz invariant, evading one condition of the theorem.
2. Nonlocality: in Sundrum’s “fat graviton” model [137], and arguably the AdS/CFT corre-
spondence, gravitons are nonlocal, and do not couple to a local stress-energy tensor.
3. No spin two fields below L: if spin two fields first emerge at the same scale as general rela-
tivity, there is no room for the Weinberg-Witten theorem to apply. For example, in models
in which the background manifold is topological [29–32, 72], there may be no nontrivial
conserved stress-energy tensor at all at small scales.
‡This explains the apparent conflict between the Weinberg-Witten theorem and the soft graviton theorem of
section 3.2. The soft graviton theorem is an on-shell result, requiring only Lorentz invariance of the S-matrix; it
has no requirement of a local, conserved Lorentz covariant stress-energy tensor.
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4. Emergent spacetime: in type II models of emergence, the basic setting of the Weinberg-
Witten theorem, spin two excitations in a flat spacetime, is absent at the fundamental level,
though one must check carefully at larger scales.
3.8 Where does the emergent theory live?
In section 1, I introduced two general categories of emergent models: type I models, which
assume a background “environment,” and type II models, in which spacetime itself is emergent.
In some ways, type II models are more appealing: if macroscopic gravity is a characteristic of
the structure of spacetime, shouldn’t the structure emerge with the spacetime itself? But for the
same reason, type II models are also much harder to connect to known physics.
Most type I models, on the other hand, present us with a basic question: what determines
the environment? For example, in models of gravitons as composite spin two particles in a flat
Minkowski space, why is the background spacetime flat? A century ago, this could have passed as
an “obvious” assumption. But once we know that curvature can be dynamical, we cannot simply
forget that knowledge; we now know that we are secretly postulating a field equation, Rabcd = 0,
for the background. Similarly, for models on a fixed lattice, what fixes the lattice topology and
spacing? We know that these features can be dynamical, as they are in Regge calculus; why do
they not evolve in these models? In particular, what prevents the back-reaction of the emergent
gravitational degrees of freedom on the “fixed” components of the environment?
These are not experimental questions, and the answer could be simply, “That’s the way Nature
is.” But the spirit of the emergent gravity program is to replace general relativity with something
more fundamental, and a fixed background seems to be a step in the wrong direction. One
interesting attempt to address such questions comes from work on “noiseless subsystems” [138],
in which the emergent structure is defined by its decoupling from the background, but it remains
to be seen whether such a special characteristic can hold for realistic models.
3.9 The usual problems of quantum gravity
Emergent gravity is sometimes advertised as a solution to the problems of quantizing general
relativity. This is not an unreasonable hope: the underlying degrees of freedom may be renor-
malizable, for instance, or may have a discrete structure that provides a natural cutoff. But there
is more to quantum gravity than renormalizability, and it is not clear that emergent models can
do better than ordinary general relativity in addressing fundamental conceptual problems [139].
For example, a quantum theory of general relativity has no local observables [16, 17], and it
is quite difficult to reconstruct a local picture of physics. As long as an emergent model recovers
diffeomorphism invariance, this problem will persist, at least at the scale at which an effective
gravitational description is possible.
Similarly, many aspects of the infamous “problem of time” [140] will remain. A model that
recovers diffeomorphism invariance will have no preferred time coordinate, and will have a Hamil-
tonian constraint rather than a Hamiltonian. If, on the other hand, the fundamental degrees of
freedom have a preferred time that does not completely decouple from the gravitational degrees
of freedom, the absence of a Hamiltonian constraint will lead to extraneous degrees of freedom,
with the concomitant problems discussed in section 3.5. Even in this case, the Weinberg-Witten
theorem will imply the absence of a Lorentz invariant, conserved Hamiltonian at the scale at
which gravity emerges.
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Causality is problematic as well. A fundamental feature of ordinary quantum field theory
is that spacelike separated operators commute. But if the metric—even an emergent one—
is subject to quantum fluctuations, there will be no fixed light cones to define spacelike and
timelike separation. In some type I models, one might hope that the underlying “environment”
defines an absolute causality. This would be radically different from the analogous classical
situation, however. Classically, if one treats the gravitational field as a massless spin two field hµν
propagating on a flat background, one finds that the nonlinearities of the action force matter to
couple to the full metric gµν = ηµν+hµν , hiding all traces of the flat background metric [102,103].
In particular, the support of Greens functions lies within the g light cones, not the η light cones.
It is true that the g light cones normally lie inside the η light cones [141], so the “emergent” metric
does not violate background causality. But this result depends on special features of classical
general relativity, and even there it holds only if matter satisfies the null energy condition, a
condition that quantum fluctuations do not obey [142].
4 Where we stand
Einstein gravity is a robust theory, which can be reached from many different starting points.
Chapter 17 of the famous textbook by Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler describes six routes to the
Einstein field equations [143]; the EPS derivation described in section 2 provides a seventh. This
might offer hope that emergent gravity could also lead to the same large scale physics.
As I have tried to show, life is not so easy. Gravity may be an emergent phenomenon, but
models of emergent gravity faces formidable obstacles. For all its simplicity, general relativity
rests heavily on a few fundamental features—local Lorentz invariance, the principle of equivalence,
diffeomorphism invariance and background independence—that are not easy to mock up.
Moreover, these features are intertwined. A local model with a background time, for instance,
must lose all traces of its Hamiltonian at the scale at which gravity emerges, or the Weinberg-
Witten theorem might force the emergent theory to be Lorentz-violating. A model in which
the gravitational field does not couple universally to matter is likely to have no single conserved
stress-energy tensor, and thus no suitable gauge invariance for a spin two field. A model whose
background environment fails to sufficiently decouple will have problems not only with Lorentz
invariance, but with diffeomorphism invariance, the principle of equivalence, and, quite likely,
Boulware-Deser ghosts.
These difficulties do not mean that the search for emergent gravity is doomed. But they
suggest that current ad hoc approaches are unlikely to succeed. While there is much to be learned
from such models, it seems likely that a successful theory of emergent gravity will require some
more fundamental principle, as yet unknown, to allow its emergent properties to be organized
into a realistic model of spacetime.
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